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CEO Turnover and Firm Performance in China’s Listed Firms 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
 
Research Question/Issue: This study investigates the relation between CEO turnover 
and firm performance in China‟s listed firms. The study examines how the sensitivity of 
CEO turnover to firm performance is moderated by the private control of firms, the 
presence of a majority shareholder and the presence of independent directors on the board.  
 
Research Findings/Insights: Using a panel of about 1200 Chinese firms per year from 
1999 to 2006 we find significant changes in the ownership and control of firms. The 
private control of firms and the fraction of independent directors on the board have 
increased considerably over time. The study finds a significant negative association 
between CEO turnover and firm performance consistent with the agency model. There is 
evidence that the CEO turnover sensitivity for poor performance is greater in firms that 
are privately controlled, or have a majority shareholder, or have a greater fraction of 
independent directors on the board. 
 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study provides empirical support for the 
agency model and the importance of internal corporate governance to attenuate agency 
costs. It provides important insights into firm governance in transition economies.  
 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to policy makers interested 
in enhancing the design of internal corporate governance within transition economies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: CEO-turnover, China, Corporate Governance 
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INTRODUCTION 
The determinants of CEO turnover provide important insights into how effectively a firm 
resolves divergent interests between top management and shareholders. By linking CEO 
employment to measures of corporate performance, firms can better align the interests of 
senior management with owners. Although there is a voluminous literature on CEO 
turnover using Western data, there are relatively few studies pertaining to China. The 
goal of our paper is to investigate the determinants of CEO turnover in China‟s listed 
firms using data from 1999 to 2006. We augment earlier CEO turnover studies from 
China (Kato, and Long 2006a, 2006b; Firth, Fung, and Rui 2006; Chang, and Wong 
2004).  
China‟s economy has matured significantly. Since early 1980s, China has 
consistently achieved an annual GDP growth rate of more than eight percent. China has 
two domestic stock exchanges which are the Shanghai Stock Exchange and ShenZhen 
Stock Exchange. Both markets opened in December 1990 and began full functioning 
from 1992. Since then the size of the market has increased dramatically.
i
 This has 
stimulated demand for a better understanding of corporate governance arrangements in 
China. This is a central concern for investors, policy makers and business leaders alike 
(Allen, Jun, and Meijun 2005b, 2005a; Xi 2006; Schipani, and Liu 2002; Jing, and Long 
2008; Firth, Fung, and Rui 2008). The ownership and control of China‟s listed firms are 
radically different from Western firms and these have important implications for CEO 
turnover. The majority of firms are former state-owned enterprises where the state 
continues to be the dominant shareholder. Firms are governed by two-tier boards, 
consisting of separate management and supervisory components where the posts of CEO 
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and Chairperson are often combined (Muller-Kahle, and Gaur 2008; Firth et al. 2006). 
Executives are often state-appointed bureaucrats whose effectiveness in delivering 
shareholder value has been questioned (Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007). Importantly, 
commentators have also questioned whether China‟s corporate governance environment 
provide adequate protection for investors (Jingu 2007; Li, Li, and Zhang 2000; Li 2004; 
Pei 2008) or provide incentives for managers to promote shareholder welfare (Kato et al. 
2006b).  
The context of our study is the reforms initiated by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) since early 2000s. These reforms were triggered by a 
string of notorious Enron-like corporate scandals in China in the late 1990s as well as 
considerable investor disappointment with the existing corporate governance 
arrangements.
ii  
In response, the CSRC passed a series of “Regulation for the Content and 
Format of Public Firms‟ Information Disclosure” in 2001 to reinforce disclosures of key 
financial information in listed firms. In August, 2001, CSRC released its “Guidelines for 
Establishing an Independent Director System in Listed Firms”, which mandates the 
adoption of independent directors on the board of domestically listed companies. In 
particular, CSRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission jointly issued new rules 
in the form of a “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies” in January 2002, 
which proposed a series of guiding principles to enhance accountabilities of top 
management and the board of directors. The apparent rationale behind the introduction of 
the corporate governance code and other corporate governance reforms was that these 
new rules would result in greater board independence and a higher quality internal 
control systems. The increased quality in governance standards would then reduce agency 
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costs and contribute to improved firm performance and ultimately enhance overall quality 
and credibility of Chinese stock markets (Fama 1980; Jensen 1993; Jensen, and Meckling 
1976).   
However, there has been skepticism that changes and developments in the 
Chinese corporate governance system are merely illusionary and may not have any 
substantive impact. In her speech about the future of China‟s capital market, Ms. Cha (the 
former vice-chairperson of CSRC) stated that the adoption of modern capital market 
practices by Chinese listed firms, particularly those transferred from previous state-
owned enterprises, was more in form than in substance in many cases (Cha 2001). In 
addition, China‟s market reforms are still far from complete. An important area is 
property rights. China still needs to fully legitimize property rights and develop a 
working and legal culture that respects them so as to safeguard investor interests (Li 
2004; Li et al. 2000). 
 
Research on CEO turnover in China 
An important implication of effective corporate governance practices is that 
poorly performing CEOs should be terminated and replaced. In the wake of recent 
governance reforms in China, our study investigates whether poor firm performance 
results in a higher probability of CEO replacement. There are comparatively few studies 
of CEO turnover in China, especially compared with the voluminous literature using 
Western data.
iii
 Kato and Long (2006b) examine CEO turnover in a pooled cross-section 
data of 634  listed firms from 1998 to 2002. They find a negative correlation between 
CEO turnover and firm performance, measured either as shareholder returns or return on 
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assets. They also find that ownership concentration, the private control of firms and board 
governance all influence CEO turnover. Specifically, the CEO turnover-performance link 
is stronger for firms with a majority shareholder and weaker for listed firms controlled by 
the state (but only for stock market performance). The CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity is more negative in firms with a greater fraction of outside directors. In 
addition, the authors find that listed firms appear to subsequently experience greater 
performance improvement after the replacement of their CEOs when the firms are 
privately controlled or have a majority controlling shareholder. In other evidence, Kato 
and Long (2006a) confirm these results but find the magnitude of the CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity is modest. Firth, Fung and Rui (2006) also investigate CEO 
turnover in a sample of firms between 1998 and 2002. They find that CEO turnover is 
negatively correlated with a firm‟s profitability but not with stock returns. The authors 
report a moderating effect for majority share ownership but not for the presence of 
independent directors. 
Other contemporary research also focuses on CEO turnover.
iv
 Chang and Long 
(2004) study CEO turnover in China between 1995 and 2000 and find no evidence of a 
significant relation between CEO turnover and stock returns, although some evidence is 
presented that CEO turnover is related to negative earnings measures. In a related study 
Chen et al (2005) find that CEO turnover in China between 1999 and 2003 increases 
significantly around a CSRC enforcement action. Although not directly showing the 
relation between CEO turnover and firm performance it attests to the importance of 
corporate governance for top executive replacement. Shen and Lin (2008) find that 
profitability and state ownership has a negative impact on top management turnover 
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when profitability is below target (measured by industry median), but no impact when 
profitability is above target. 
Overall, the mixed findings from previous studies warrant further research on 
CEO turnover. Our study is significantly different from prior studies in a number of 
important ways. First, we investigate the relation between CEO turnover and firm 
performance in China‟s listed firms between 2002 and 2006. Since the early 2000s, 
China‟s market and corporate governance reforms have deepened. It is therefore critical 
to understand whether these reforms have strengthened internal controls thus affecting 
the dismissal likelihood of CEOs in poor performing firms. This is our primary 
contribution to the extant literature. Second, we investigate whether governance 
arrangements alter the relation between CEO turnover and organizational performance. 
Specifically, we investigate whether the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance 
is greater in privately controlled of firms; whether the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance is greater in firms with a major controlling shareholder; and finally whether 
the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is greater in firms with a larger 
fraction of outside directors on the board. Each of these hypotheses is grounded in 
previous research (Hermalin, and Weisbach 2003; Kato et al. 2006a, 2006b). In summary, 
we investigate whether corporate governance factors moderate the sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to firm performance. Finally, our dataset consists of a large number of firms per 
year amounting to almost all firms listed on China‟s domestic exchanges. We document 
the evolution of private controlled firms; changes in ownership structure and changes in 
the outside directors on boards of directors before and after the corporate governance 
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reforms. We therefore are able to map institutional changes in a major transition 
economies (Peng 2000; Peng, and Delios 2006; Peng 2003; Wright et al. 2005). 
The main findings of this paper may be briefly summarized as follows. First, we 
find a negative and significant association between CEO turnover and firm performance, 
measured by both accounting value and market returns. CEOs of China‟s listed firms are 
therefore disciplined for poor performance. Second, CEO turnover and performance 
relation is generally stronger in privately controlled firms or firms with a greater fraction 
of outside directors on the board. There is little evidence that having a major shareholder 
on the board is associated with stronger CEO turnover and performance sensitivity. The 
empirical results are consistent with agency models of corporate governance. Third, we 
find that privately controlled firms have increased significantly in the public market over 
time (and state control has diminished). Ownership of Chinese public firms remains 
highly concentrated. About one-third of firms have an owner with greater than fifty 
percent share stake. However, the prevalence of ownership concentration has declined 
over time. In addition, outside directors on boards are much more common after the 
reform. About ninety percent of firms now have at least one third of the board comprised 
of outside directors. Our results augment previous findings on CEO turnover in China 
(Kato et al. 2006a, 2006b; Chang et al. 2004; Firth et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2005). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
theoretical issues and hypotheses. This is followed by a method section where the data, 
measurement and analysis issues are addressed. We then present the results, followed by 
a discussion section containing our conclusions.  
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THEORETICAL ISSUES AND HYPOTHESES 
The standard approach to investigating CEO turnover is agency theory (Jensen 1993; 
Hermalin, and Weisbach 1998). In the absence of complete information and credibly 
enforceable-contracts agents (the manger) can behave opportunistically at the principal‟s 
(owner) expense. Agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control 
can be mitigated by the complementary intervention of both internal and external control 
mechanisms.
v
 An important internal control mechanism is the board of directors (Jensen 
1983, 1993). In particular, when the boards are designed effectively, a firm should be 
able to replace CEOs who have performed poorly. As a result, the threat of termination 
may provide CEOs with powerful incentives to pursue the owners‟ interests (Weisbach 
1988). Previous empirical research on CEO turnover, using Anglo-Saxon data, has 
generally found a negative relation between CEO turnover and firm performance (e.g. 
Brickley 2003, Volpin 2002; Weisbach 1995).
vi
   
The hypothesized negative relation between management turnover and firm 
performance may be strengthened when corporate governance environments are more 
conducive. For example, in the 1990s the UK introduced a series of corporate governance 
reforms aimed at improving the quality of firm governance and to protect investors. With 
the enhanced governance rules one might expect that key board decisions, such as 
whether to replace a poorly performing CEO or not, would improve. Dahya and 
McConnell (2002) indeed show the negative association between CEO turnover and firm 
performance in UK firms is stronger following the introduction of the Cadbury Report in 
1992, which required public firms to include an adequate proportion of independent 
outside directors on the board. In a similar way, we conjecture that if the Chinese 
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corporate governance reforms achieved their intended objectives to improve the quality 
of internal governance, then poorly performing CEOs are more likely to be replaced. The 
discussion of incentives and governance leads to our main empirical prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relation between CEO turnover and firm performance 
in China’s listed firms. 
 
We next consider the role of ownership and control in driving CEO incentives. 
Prior research has argued that state-controlled firms in China provide weaker incentives 
for managers to pursue profit maximization and to increase firm value, compared with 
privately controlled firms (Kato et al. 2006a, 2006b). It has been observed that managers 
of state-controlled firms are more likely to be state-appointed bureaucrats with weak 
incentives to deliver shareholder value (Fan et al. 2007). Unlike privately-controlled 
firms, the state exercises control rights in listed firms mainly through state-owned asset 
management companies. Government officials are appointed to the board and act as 
custodian of these state assets. However, these officials are often unable or unwilling to 
diligently pursue their fiduciary roles, promote efficiency or profit goals. In addition they 
often have complex and opaque relationships with top management and are often prior 
state owned enterprise officials (Allen et al. 2005b, 2005a). In many cases, state officials 
have to consider non-performance factors of executive appointments. For example, 
appointments of many top officials of listed prior state owned enterprises have to be 
approved by the Chinese Communist Party‟s Department of Organization (Kato et al. 
2006a, 2006b). As a result, we expect that privately-controlled firms are more able to 
 11 
discipline managers for poor performance compared to state-controlled firms. We 
therefore predict:  
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relation between CEO-turnover and firm performance 
in privately controlled firms. 
 
We next consider how the sensitivity of CEO-turnover to firm performance is 
influenced by a firm‟s ownership structure in China‟s listed firms. When shareholdings 
are diffused or widely held, individual owners have weak incentives to monitor 
managers‟ behaviour due to the free-rider problem. It is also difficult for them to exert 
sufficient influence over key corporate decisions such as CEO succession. Weak 
incentives and free-rider problems may be mitigated by concentrated ownership. A 
greater share-ownership stake can provide block-holders or controlling shareholders with 
stronger incentives to supervise managerial activities (Jensen 1993). As a result, a 
concentrated ownership structure may be a signal of better shareholder monitoring 
quality. The Chinese corporate governance reforms, including the Chinese corporate 
governance code, provide shareholders greater power to exercise their ownership rights 
and to protect their investment by participating in major company affairs. Therefore, we 
would expect stronger shareholder activism by a controlling shareholder to discipline 
management. A controlling shareholder with a large equity stake thus is able to influence 
major corporate events, for example replacing CEO in case of poor performance (Denis, 
Denis, and Sarin 1997a). Therefore, we would generally expect the sensitivity to firm 
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performance to be stronger (i.e. more negative) when there is a majority shareholder 
present. 
However, a concentrated ownership may also exacerbate and lead to different 
types of moral hazard problems. Large equity holdings by a majority shareholder may 
result in greater power for them to expropriate minority investors, in which case the 
controlling owner may use their dominant voting power to treat themselves preferentially 
and withdraw private benefits at the expense of other investors (Adams, and Ferreira 
2007; Shleifer, and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 2000; la Porta et al. 1998; Xu, Zhu, and 
Lin 2005).
vii
 The problem of expropriation by controlling shareholders is argued to be 
extremely severe in Chinese stock markets because of a more primitive disclosure 
system. Such an entrenchment problem may inversely influence the capability of 
controlling shareholders to discipline CEOs in the case of poor performance. Overall, 
having noted this important caveat, we predict that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relation between CEO-turnover and firm performance 
in firms with a major controlling shareholder. 
 
Our final hypothesis relates to the role of independent directors on the board of directors. 
The role of the board of directors is to hire, fire and compensate the CEO (Jensen 1993, 
1983). Eugene Fama has stated that: „the board is viewed as a market-induced institution, 
the ultimate internal monitor of the set of contracts called a firm, whose most important 
role is to scrutinise the highest decision makers within the firm‟ (Fama 1980). However, 
directors will not necessarily make decisions consistent with shareholder interests. For 
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example, board members who are inside directors or interlocked directors, those holding 
managerial or contractual positions in the company, may owe their positions to CEOs and 
make decisions more aligned with CEO interests. As a result, they may be reluctant to 
discipline CEOs even in case of poor performance. The extant governance literature has 
therefore focused on the role of independent outside directors as the guardians of 
shareholder interests (Weisbach 1988, 1995; Hermalin et al. 2003, 1998). For example, 
Weisbach (1988) found that CEO-turnover is more sensitive to firm performance when 
boards are dominated by outside directors compared to insider-dominated board in a 
sample of U.S. firms. China‟s corporate governance reform requires listed companies to 
introduce independent directors to their board, who are supposed to carry their duties 
independently and not subject to the influence of management. If such arrangements are 
effective, we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relation between CEO-turnover and firm performance 
in firms with a greater fraction of independent directors on the board. 
 
METHODS 
Data 
In order to test the hypotheses we constructed our sample by combining two 
significant databases. These are the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) 
database and the CSMAR-A financial database. The primary corporate governance data 
used in this study was supplied by the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) 
Sinofin Information Service. This database covers the population of firms listed on 
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Shanghai Stock Exchange and ShenZhen Stock Exchange. It contains a wealth of 
corporate governance information germane to our study, including information on firm 
ownership, the board of directors, CEO-turnover for the period 1998 onwards.
 viii
  The 
SinoFin data is collected directly from public firms‟ annual financial reports as published 
in Securities Time, Shanghai Securities Daily, China Securities Daily, and other major 
newspapers designated by the CSRC. Each input item is coded twice by two people to 
provide a cross-check and ensure coding accuracy. The Sinofin data has also been used in 
previous empirical research (Kato et al. 2006a, 2006b). 
The financial and market information is obtained from CSMAR-A database, 
which collects financial and market information of all firms listed in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. These data are also first-hand data collected from CSRC 
designated newspapers. Again, the data is double-checked among statements published in 
different sources is performed to ensure accuracy of the information.  
 
Measuring CEO turnover 
The primary dependent variable in our econometric models is CEO turnover. Kato 
and Long (2006a) point out that use of the job-title „Chief Executive Officer‟ or „CEO‟ to 
identify the most senior firm executive is a relatively new phenomenon in China. Only 
recently are companies beginning to use this nomenclature and historically the term 
General Manager (zongjinli) has been used instead (Kato et al. 2006a). However, as both 
Kato and Long (2006a) and Firth et al (2006) argue, classifying the top executive in a 
Chinese company is complex (and assuming the General Manager is the CEO may be 
inappropriate). According to Kato and Long (2006a) the Chairman of the board of 
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directors is the legal representative of the firm and can also be considered the top 
executive. The Chairman is appointed by the largest shareholder, is often very powerful, 
and is involved in the executive running of the firm. Moreover, Firth et al (2006) claim 
that “the chairman is an executive position and ranks highest in the firm (it ranks above 
the CEO or general manger)”. In about 18% of China‟s listed firms the posts of General 
Manager and Chairman are held by the same person, so in the majority of cases an 
algorithm or some decision rule is required to identify the “CEO”. Kato and Long 
(2006a) measure turnover using a decision rule about who is the General Manager and 
who is the Chairman.
ix
 In contrast, Firth et al (2006) focus on the turnover of Chairman 
and do not consider the General Manager. 
Given these complexities, we adopt the following simple strategy. We define two 
dependent variables: CH_TURNOVER is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a 
change in the Chairman during the fiscal year and zero otherwise. GM_TURNOVER is a 
dummy variable equal to one if there is a change in the General Manager during the fiscal 
year and zero otherwise. Both of these variables are given in the SinoFin data base. In 
turn Sinofin identifies the change in General Manager and/or Chairman from the firm‟s 
annual report.
x
 This strategy has distinct advantages. First, we are not forced to make a 
prediction about the precise identity of the “CEO” which can lead to mistakes and 
misclassifications (statistical type I and II errors). Second, we can model separately the 
determinants of Chairman turnover as well as General Manager turnover. In the absence 
of certainty about the most senior executive this seems to be a reasonable empirical 
strategy. Using the variable CH_TURNOVER is consistent with the procedure 
recommended by Firth et al (2006). In addition, we note that in our data set the 
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CH_TURNOVER measure is also highly correlated with the variable construct proposed 
by Kato and Long (2006a). 
It is important to stress a limitation with the construction of the CEO turnover 
variable. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between “voluntary” turnovers (arising 
from retirements, resignations, job-moves etc.) and “involuntary” turnovers (arising from 
termination, forced dismissal etc). However, in practice, it is often difficult to accurately 
distinguish between a voluntary and involuntary CEO departure. For example, a CEO 
who is fired may „save-face‟ by being allowed to resign or change job or have his 
contract expire. Some authors have attempted such a classification. Chang and Wong‟s 
(2004) analysis of about 1000 CEO turnovers in China between 1995 and 2000 found 
only about 4% of cases were dismissals, but a change of job and contract expiration 
accounted for about 50% of CEO turnovers. Firth et al (2006) also attempt to distinguish 
between forced and voluntary resignation by investigating news reports. Again, a very 
small proportion of the cases are identified as forced resignation. Kato and Long (2006a) 
or Kato and Long (2006b) do not focus on the voluntary-involuntary departure 
distinction; and our research is consistent with this. 
 
Analysis 
We estimate a standard logit model of CEO turnover. Let p be the probability of CEO 
turnover, such that p=Pr(TURNOVER). The augmented CEO turnover and performance 
equation can be specified as follows: 
ln[ p/(1-p) ] = β0 + β1PERFORMANCE + β2PRIVATE  
+ β3MAJOR + β4DIRECTOR  
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+ β5PERFORMANCEPRIVATE  
+ β6PERFORMANCEMAJOR 
+ β7PERFORMANCEDIRECTOR  
+ β8CONTROLS +      (1), 
where p/(1-p) is the odds ratio and ln[ p/(1-p) ] is simply the natural logarithm of the odds. 
The estimation of this CEO turnover equation is consistent with previous studies using 
data from Anglo-Saxon economies as well as China. The dependent variable, CEO 
turnover, is measured as either GM_TURNOVER (equal to 1 if there is a change in the 
General Manager; 0 otherwise) or CH_TURNOVER (equal to 1 if there is a change in the 
Chairman; 0 otherwise) as discussed earlier. 
The terms β1 to β8 are parameters to be estimated. One can think of parameters β2 
to β4 as capturing the direct impact of the explanatory variables on the log-odds of CEO 
turnover and parameters β5 to β7 as the interaction variables. Our hypotheses can be tested 
using this model. Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative correlation between CEO turnover and 
firm performance, namely we expect that β1<0; hypothesis 2 predicts a negative 
correlation between CEO-turnover and firm performance in privately controlled firms, 
namely β5<0; hypotheses 3 predicts a negative relation between CEO-turnover and firm 
performance in firms with a controlling shareholder, namely β6<0; and finally hypotheses 
4 predicts a negative relation between CEO-turnover and firm performance in firms with 
a greater fraction of independent directors on the board, namely we expect β7 <0. The 
error term is given by  in the estimating equation. Our estimated models report z-
statistics corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity. We use the Huber (1964) and White 
(1980) transformation method that yields robust standard errors. 
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Explanatory variables 
Based on previous research, firm performance (PERFORMANCE) is measured in 
two different ways. First, we use a market-based measure: the firm‟s annualized stock 
returns calculated from monthly data (we denote this SHR). Second, we use an 
accounting-based measure: return on assets (ROA), calculated as net profits divided by 
total assets. These measures have been used in prior China research on CEO turnover 
(Firth et al. 2006; Kato et al. 2006a, 2006b) Such market and accounting-based 
performance metrics have also been used in the wider literature on CEO replacement 
(Kaplan 1994). Both firm performance measures used in this study are averaged over the 
current and previous year to help account for potential causal and endogenous variable 
concerns. This strategy is consistent with prior research (Kato et al. 2006b; Conyon 1998). 
Private ownership (PRIVATE) is an indicator variable set equal to one if the 
ultimate ownership of the firm is under private control and zero otherwise. Majority share 
ownership (MAJOR) is an indicator variable equal to one if the largest shareholder owns 
more than 50 percent of the firms‟ shares. The presence of independent directors is a 
binary variable equal to one if the fraction of independent directors on the main board is 
at least one-third. This is consistent with previous research (Kato et al. 2006a, 2006b). 
The econometric model includes a set of control variables (CONTROLS) to 
mitigate potentially confounding effects (Hermalin & Weisbach 2003; Weisbach 1988). 
LSALES is the log for firm size measured as the log of firm sales. VOL measures the 
volatility of the firm‟s operating environment and is measured as the annualized standard 
deviation of stock returns from monthly stock returns data over the year. FIRM_AGE 
captures the number of years a firm has been listed. In addition, the models contain a set 
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of industry dummy variables to capture inter-industry heterogeneity in managerial labor 
markets.
xi
 Year dummies are included to control for macro-economic effects. This is 
consistent with previous research relating board structure to CEO turnover (Kato et al. 
2006a, 2006b; Weisbach 1988; Conyon, and Florou 2002). Since the control variables do 
not form part of the main hypotheses we do not give predicted signs for them. 
In the tables below we report the marginal effects from the transformed 
coefficient estimates from the logit model. For the logit model in (1), the estimated 
coefficients do not have a direct economic interpretation. In consequence, to get an idea 
of the economic significance of a given variable it is important to calculate the marginal 
effects. The marginal effect of the k
th
 explanatory variable X on the probability of CEO 
turnover is given as: ∂[CEO_TURNOVER=1/X]/∂Xk=sβk where 
s=exp(X‟β)/[1+exp(X‟β)]2. Intuitively, the marginal effects are calculated by rescaling 
the estimated coefficients from the estimated logit equation and can be interpreted as the 
incremental effect on CEO turnover brought about from an incremental change in the 
explanatory variable Xk. An analogous procedure is given for dummy variables. The 
economic interpretation is switching from zero to one, for example in the case of the 
dummy variable PRIVATE it is the effect on CEO turnover of changing from “state 
control” to “private control”.xii 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics results 
Table 1 presents basic information on the sample characteristics as well as descriptive 
statistics on the variables used in the analysis. Panel A shows the number of firms listed 
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in China and the number of firms in the sample for which we have CEO turnover data, 
measured as the change in executive chairman (CH_TURNOVER). Our results are not 
altered if we proxy CEO change by the change in General Manager (GM_TURNOVER).
 
 
In general, our sample consists of approximately 90% of listed firms on both Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges and in consequence is representative of listed firms in 
China. This is an important aspect of this study.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Panel B first shows turnover of Chairman (CH_TURNOVER) and General 
Managers (GM_TURNOVER) in China‟s listed firms. The turnover rate of Chairman 
CEOs is less than General Manager CEOs. These turnover rates are significantly greater 
than CEO turnover rates observed in Western data (Hermalin et al. 2003; Conyon 1998). 
The average turnover rate of Chairman is about 25% and General Managers about 38%. 
The results are consistent with Kato and Long (2006b) who report an annual CEO 
turnover rate of 24% using a measure that is closely related to the CH_TURNOVER 
measure used in this study. We find that on average about 21% of listed firms in China 
are privately controlled. The overall private control rate conceals significant time-series 
variation. Private control of China‟s listed firms has increased significantly over the 
sample period, from about 9% in 1999 to approximately 34% in 2006. The rise in 
privately controlled firms, which have more than doubled over this period, is attributed to 
the decline in state control over the period. The state has withdrawn significantly, 
although still remains as the largest controlling owner of listed firms. In un-tabulated 
results, overall state control of enterprises is about 75%.  
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China‟s listed firms are frequently controlled by a single large shareholder. 
Approximately 37% of firms had a major shareholder with at least a 50% shareholding 
(MAJOR) between 1999 and 2006. However, the percentage of firms with a shareholder 
owning at least 50% of shares has declined significantly from about 42% in 1999 to 28% 
in 2006.  
Finally, we find that about 49% of China‟s listed firms have boards comprised of 
at least one-third independent directors over the sample period. This has changed 
significantly over the sample period. In 1999 only 3% of boards were comprised of at 
least one third of independent directors. The number increases drastically in 2002, where 
19% of firms having one third of independent directors on the board. In year 2003, the 
number jumps to 74%. By 2006 about 87% of firms have one-third of independent 
directors. In addition, in year 1999, there is barely any outside directors on the board. 
There is a huge jump in the fraction of independent directors on the board in year 2002, 
where the number increases from the 2001 level of 6% to 24%. These results indicate that 
corporate governance reforms have brought a significant change in the board structure of 
Chinese listed firms.
xiii
 
 
Econometric results 
Table 2 shows our primary econometric results, based on the sample period 2002 to 2006. 
The dependent variable is CH_TURNOVER: the replacement of the firm‟s Executive 
Chairman during the year. Its use is consistent with Kato and Long (2006a) and Firth et al 
(2006). The performance measure in Columns 1 and 2 is shareholder returns (SHR). The 
performance measure in Columns 3 and 4 is return on assets (ROA). This is the 
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fundamental distinction between market and accounting-based performance. All the 
regressions have control variables for size, company volatility (risk), industry, and time 
effects. Recall, that the marginal effects are reported rather than the mvore difficult to 
interpret coefficient estimates from the logit model. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative association between CEO turnover and firm 
performance in China‟s listed firms. The hypothesis is confirmed in the data. There is a 
significant negative correlation between CEO turnover and both market and accounting 
performance (Table 1, columns 1 and 3). CEOs of China‟s listed firms face a greater 
likelihood of dismissal for poor corporate performance. The evidence is consistent with 
(Firth et al. 2006; Kato et al. 2006a, 2006b) who similarly establish a negative CEO 
turnover-performance relation but for an earlier pre-reform time period. The reported 
marginal effects suggest that an incremental decrease in stock returns is associated with 
an increase in the likelihood of CEO-turnover by approximately twelve percent. In 
contrast, a small decrease in return on assets is associated with an increase in the CEO 
turnover-likelihood by about ten percent. In the baseline model, therefore, CEO-turnover 
is sensitive to accounting and market-based performance metrics. 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative relation between CEO-turnover and firm 
performance in privately controlled firms. The hypothesis is confirmed for the 
shareholder return measure: the estimated coefficient on the interaction variable 
PERFORMANCEPRIVATE is negative and statistically significant. The estimated 
marginal effect suggests that a falling stock returns in privately controlled firms is 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of CEO departure by about 10%. Curiously, 
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for the return on asset performance measure the interaction term is positive, which is 
contrary to our hypothesis. The empirical evidence suggests that privately controlled 
listed firms rely more on stock market performance than accounting performance to 
discipline managers. This may be because accounting measures are potentially 
„subjective‟ and prone to more manipulation by management. In contrast, the market-
based measures are more „objective‟ and less prone to manipulation by management. We 
conclude that CEOs of privately-controlled listed firms face a greater likelihood of 
dismissal for declining stock returns. This evidence is consistent with other research 
using earlier data (Kato et al. 2006b). 
Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative relation between CEO-turnover and performance 
for firms with a major controlling shareholder. The estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term PERFORMANCEMAJOR is significantly positive for the stockholder 
returns measure but not for the return on assets measure. The results for the stock returns 
measure is contrary to our expectation. CEOs at firms with a major controlling 
shareholder face a decrease in the likelihood of CEO turnover for a decrease in 
performance. There is no evidence suggesting that listed firms with a major shareholder 
rely on accounting performance to discipline or replace managers. 
Finally, hypothesis 4 predicts a negative association between CEO-turnover and 
firm performance in firms with a greater fraction of independent directors on the board. 
The estimated coefficient on PERFORMANCEDIRECTOR is statistically significant 
for the stock returns variable but not for return on assets. The evidence supports the view 
that firms with a greater fraction of independent directors on the board are more likely to 
discipline CEOs for poor stock returns in China‟s listed firms. However, there is little 
 24 
evidence points to poor return on assets. Our evidence is consistent with other research 
on China (Firth et al. 2006; Kato et al. 2006a, 2006b) as well as with studies using 
Western data (Weisbach 1988). 
Table 3 re-estimates the CEO turnover equations and now used the change in 
General Manager (GM_TURNOVER) as the left-hand side (dependent) variable. The 
results are qualitatively similar to Table 2, with some subtle differences. Hypothesis 1 
predicts a negative correlation between CEO turnover and firm performance and this is 
confirmed in Columns 1 and 3. Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative correlation between 
CEO-turnover and firm performance in privately controlled firms. This is confirmed for 
stock-returns but not for return on assets where the interaction term is insignificant. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative relation between CEO-turnover and firm performance in 
firms with a controlling shareholder. This is not confirmed for either stock returns or 
return on assets. Hypothesis 4 predicts a negative relation between CEO-turnover and 
firm performance in firms with a greater fraction of independent directors on the board. 
This is confirmed for the case of stock returns but not for return on assets. 
 It is also important to comment on the direct effect of the explanatory variables 
PRIVATE, MAJOR and DIRECTOR in the regression models. Generally, these effects 
are not significant in Table 2, when we measure the Executive Chairperson turnover. In 
the case of General Managers (Table 3), we find privately owned firms (PRIVATE) are 
more likely to replace CEOs compared to state-owned firms (about 8% more likely). In 
this sense, being the CEO of a privately controlled is more „risky‟. We find no direct 
effect of majority share ownership (MAJOR) on the likelihood of CEO replacement. In 
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contrast, firms with a greater fraction of outside directors (DIRECTOR) are less likely to 
replace their CEOs (between 3% and 5% less likely).  
 Considering the control variables in the analyses we find that larger firms 
(LSALES) are less likely to replace their CEOs (by approximately 1% to 2%). Firms with 
greater stock-price volatility (VOL) are more likely to replace their CEOs (by 
approximately 7% to 8%). Finally, older more established firms (FIRM_AGE) are more 
likely to replace the CEO (by approximately 1%). Generally, the control variables are 
jointly significant on the basis of a Wald test as well as being individually statistically 
significant. 
 In summary, we find qualified support for our four hypotheses. We are able to 
identify a significantly negative association between firm performance, measured either 
as stock returns or return on assets, and CEO replacement (hypotheses 1). Poorly 
performing CEOs of China‟s listed firms face a greater likelihood of job termination 
compared to high performing CEOs. The evidence for the other hypotheses (hypotheses 2, 
3, and 4) is mixed and depends on the choice of performance term, as seen in the 
interaction variables.  
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Our primary results, reported in the previous section, are based on the time period 2002 
to 2006. This is the time frame when the new governance regulations, including but not 
exclusively the Corporate Governance Code, were introduced in China. One important 
issue to address is whether our results are sensitive to the choice of estimation period. We 
have data going back to 1999 so we are able to re-estimate the regressions underlying 
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equation (1) for the period 1999 to 2001. Recall, this is a period prior to the major 
corporate governance reforms. The results are presented in Table 4. 
The main hypothesis 1 predicts a negative association between CEO turnover and 
firm performance. The hypothesis is confirmed for return on assets (ROA) in columns 3 
and 4. The estimated coefficient is negative and significant. In contrast, there is little 
evidence of a statistical relation between CEO turnover and stock returns over the period 
1999 to 2001. In column 1 the sign on SHR is negative but insignificant at the 10% level. 
The results are consistent with Firth et al (2006) who also find a negative correlation 
between CEO replacement and return on assets but not between turnover and stock 
returns. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
In the sensitivity analysis we find very little empirical support for hypotheses 2 to 
4 for the period 1999 to 2001. There is no effect of private-control, majority-share 
ownership or independent directors on the CEO-turnover and performance sensitivity. 
The interaction terms between firm performance and private ownership 
(PERFORMANCEPRIVATE), performance and majority share ownership 
(PERFORMANCEMAJOR) and performance and the presence of independent director 
(PERFORMANCEDIRECTOR) are not significant (see columns 2 and 4).  
We conclude that our hypotheses 2 to 4 are potentially sensitive to the choice of 
the time-period under investigation and appear to be more relevant to the years from 2002 
to 2006. In addition, we find that the effect of the direct variables is different in Table 3 
compared with Table 2. For example, majority share ownership (MAJOR) is now 
negative and significant, whereas it is not significant in Table 2. The variable measuring 
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the independence of the board (DIRECTOR) is now significantly negative, compared to 
significantly positive in Tables 2 & 3. In summary, these additional empirical results 
attest to the importance of investigating whether corporate governance effects are 
sensitive to the time period under investigation as the effects of explanatory variables 
may be different in each.
xiv
 In this case we find salient differences between the analysis 
of 1999 to 2002 and 2002 to 2006. 
 Our final piece of empirical analysis investigates whether the sensitivity of CEO 
replacement to firm performance is different in the period before the introduction of the 
corporate governance code and other key regulations in China (1999 to 2001) and the 
period after (2002 to 2006). To conduct this analysis we simply defined a dummy 
variable equal to one for the years 2002 to 2006 and zero otherwise. We call this variable 
GOV_CODE. We then interact this with the performance term (PERFORMAMCE). The 
coefficient estimate on the interaction term (PERFORMANCEGOV_CODE) captures 
the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance in the period after 2002. Recall, this 
is the time when the corporate governance code and other major regulations were 
introduced. If CEOs are more likely to be replaced for poor performance in the period 
since 2002 we expect a negative coefficient. However, if it is not possible to precisely 
identify the time when the code and other regulations gained traction, then such negative 
correlation is not likely to be observed. The results are contained in Table 5. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Table 5 uses the change in Chairman (CH_TURNOVER) as the proxy variable 
for CEO replacement. Using the alternative variable, a change in General Manager 
(GM_TURNOVER), yielded qualitatively similar results. Columns 1 and 3 give the 
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estimates from estimating the base-line model over the whole sample period. Importantly, 
we find a significantly negative correlation between CEO turnover and firm performance, 
measured either as stock returns or return on assets. This corroborates hypothesis 1 for 
the longer sample period 1999 to 2006. We find that CEOs at poorly performing Chinese 
firms are more likely to be replaced. Columns 2 and 4 contain the full model specification 
and also include the extra variables GOV_CODE and the interaction term 
PERFORMANCEGOV_CODE. We find that GOV_CODE is significantly negative, 
suggesting lower CEO turnover in the period after 2002. The term 
PERFORMANCEGOV_CODE is insignificant in the case of stock returns. Contrary to 
expectations it is significantly positive in the case of return on assets. The results suggest 
little evidence of a more negative sensitivity of CEO replacement to firm performance in 
the period since 2002. The period after the introduction of governance codes and other 
regulations is not associated with greater CEO replacement for poor performance from 
our analysis. 
One reason for this result might be that splitting the time period into pre-2002 and 
post-2002 sub-samples may be inappropriate. It may simply be there is no single 
regulation or rule passed by the CSRC that can be viewed as a landmark change in the 
corporate governance regime that warrants such a demarcation, including the “Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China”.xv Instead, there have been many 
related rules and regulations designed with the goal to improve the corporate governance 
quality of Chinese listed firms.
xvi
 These different regulations attempted, in quite a piece-
meal fashion, to address the various aspects of corporate governance in listed firms in 
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China. So, it might be very difficult to identify a specific point in time to identify a 
structural break where the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance changes.  
 
DISCUSSION 
In this study we have presented new empirical evidence on the relation between CEO-
turnover and firm performance in China‟s listed firms. Our dataset is unique, 
comprehensive and effectively covers the population of firms on the Chinese domestic 
exchanges. This is an important strength of the study and builds significantly on previous 
research by using a larger and more comprehensive set of firms. Our study provided 
insights into the effectiveness of corporate governance regimes in transition economies. 
China is an exemplar transition economy. By focusing on the period since 2002, it 
complements other recent studies on CEO turnover in China, which have typically used 
data and firms up to 2003 and so many of the changes in corporate governance were still 
in comparative infancy. (Firth et al. 2006; Kato et al. 2006a, 2006b; Chen et al. 2005). 
Our study is therefore timely in as much as it examines the drivers of CEO turnover in an 
era of changed (and changing) corporate and regulatory governance. 
Our analysis focused on the central idea from the agency theory that managers of 
poorly-performing companies are terminated more frequently than managers of well-
performing firms. This implicit contract provides important incentives for senior 
executives to promote owners‟ interests. This is a fundamental theme within the 
corporate governance field, but has been primarily tested using data from Anglo-Saxon 
economies such as the United States and the United Kingdom (Murphy 1999; Weisbach 
1988, 1995; Hermalin et al. 2003, 1998; Conyon, and Murphy 2000; Conyon 1998; 
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Conyon et al. 2002). The strength of our study is that we focus on China, widely regarded 
as an exemplar transition economy. A novel feature of our analysis is that we have 
relatively long time series of data and that we investigated the CEO turnover performance 
sensitivity after the introduction of major corporate governance reforms in the early 
2000s. We focused on this period since changes in the legal and regulatory environment 
may potentially improve governance quality and thus the sensitivity of CEO-turnover to 
firm performance (Chen et al. 2005). 
 Our study yielded a number of significant findings. First, we isolated a negative 
and statistically significant association between CEO turnover and firm performance. 
This fundamental hypothesis is a seemingly robust statistical finding throughout the 
various analyses. The empirical evidence is consistent with the prediction that CEOs in 
China are disciplined for poor corporate performance. As such CEOs have important 
career incentives to promote shareholder and profit goals. Our results complement other 
studies of CEO turnover in China based on data from earlier periods (Firth et al. 2006; 
Kato et al. 2006a) and augments evidence that CEOs in China are replaced in poorly 
performing firms. From 2002 to 2006, a period characterized by deepening market 
reforms, we isolated a significantly negative association between CEO replacement and 
stock returns as well as CEO replacement and return on assets. We found this relation in 
the longer time-period from 1999 to 2006 too. However, our various sensitivity analyses 
failed to find convincing evidence that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance 
changed significantly after 2002 when the corporate governance code and other 
regulation were introduced. This may be due to it is hard to disentangle the effects of the 
different corporate governance regulations that have occurred in China or because the 
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effects of the changes have yet to manifest themselves. Investigating China‟s regulatory 
codes and listing rules is an important area for further research. 
Second, our study investigated various moderating (or interaction) effects on the 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance. Specifically, we probed whether the 
sensitivity of CEO replacement to firm performance was different in privately controlled 
firms, firms with majority shareholders and firms with a high fraction of independent 
directors. In these statistical tests we found mixed results. The sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to stockholder returns is significantly stronger in privately controlled firms. 
Privately controlled firms, therefore, are more likely to replace CEOs for poor 
performance, compared to state-owned firms. This is consistent with predictions from the 
agency theory and complements other studies (Kato et al. 2006a, 2006b).  
In addition, we found that the sensitivity of CEO turnover stock returns is stronger 
in firms with a greater fraction of independent directors on the board. In short, boards 
with a large complement of outside directors are more likely to replace CEOs for poor 
performance. Again, this is consistent with the agency theory as well as prior empirical 
research from the US (Weisbach 1988) and China (Kato et al. 2006b). However, we 
found no evidence that firms with a major shareholder (whose share stake was at least 
50%) were more likely to discipline CEOs for poor performance. These general findings 
for the sensitivity of CEO replacement to stock returns were more difficult to isolate in 
the case of the alternative performance measure, return on assets. This is perhaps 
attributable to the idea that accounting-based measures of performance are potentially 
more subjective and noisy as a performance management tool. We also found that our 
results were not overly sensitive to some technical issues of how to measure the post of 
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most senior executive or CEO -- a concern raised in previous research by Kato and Long 
(2006a) and Firth et al (2006). 
Third, our findings showed deepening of China‟s market reforms. Since 1999, the 
first year in our data set, the presence of privately controlled firms has increased 
considerably. The fraction of privately listed firms more than doubled between 1999 and 
2006. This is associated with a decline in state ownership of China‟s firms. Ownership 
concentration still remains at a very high level, especially compared with Anglo-Saxon 
economies. Our results also documented that the average number of firms with a majority 
shareholder control (greater than 50%) has declined over time. In addition, we found the 
fraction of independent outside directors on boards has increased significantly and the 
number of firms with one-third of the board comprised of outsiders has similarly 
increased. All these changes point to significant changes in the governance of China‟s 
listed firms. The reforms signal China‟s continued commitment to market reforms and 
the implicit belief that such changes will results in greater firm and economic efficiency.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This study has contributed to the corporate governance literature by investigating 
the determinants of CEO turnover in China. Currently, there are only a few published 
papers in this area (Firth et al. 2006; Kato et al. 2006a, 2006b) and our study augments 
these. We have demonstrated a negative association between CEO turnover and 
performance. We have shown that under certain circumstances governance institutions 
(such as the private control of firms and the structure of boards) may moderate this 
relation. Although our study is unique in a number of respects, there are some limitations 
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which may usefully form the basis of future research. First, due to the limitations of the 
data, we were not able to distinguish between „voluntary‟ and „involuntary‟ causes of 
CEO-turnover. Future research may want to address this issue. Second, our analysis 
offers insights into the determinants of CEO turnover in China. It does not examine the 
consequences of CEO turnover for subsequent organizational performance. For example, 
does firm performance improve once the CEO is replaced? This is another potentially 
important topic for future study. Third, we were unable to collect the demographics of the 
CEO such as CEO age, education, and job tenure and our results should be considered in 
this light. 
Despite these potential limitations, our paper provides important unique evidence 
on the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance in China. It also examined the 
moderating role of private ownership, majority shareholder control and the role of 
independent directors. Our hope is that our findings will provide the stimulus for further 
research on the interplay between the organization‟s external environment and the 
decisions made by key actors within the firm.  
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Sample characteristics 
 
YEAR  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
           
CH_TURNOVER 833 933 1088 1133 1200 1257 1339 1345 9128 
LISTED FIRMS 949 1088 1160 1224 1287 1377 1381 1434 9900 
PERCENT 88% 86% 94% 93% 93% 91% 97% 94% 9528 
 
Notes: Table contains number of observations by year. Key to variables: CH_TURNOVER = 1 if 
there is a change in the Chairman in the fiscal year, zero otherwise. This is CEO turnover. 
LISTED FIRMS is the number of listed firms in China (total). PERCENT is LISTED FIRMS 
divided by CH_TURNOVER as a percentage. 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics 
 
YEAR  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
 
CH_TURNOVER 
 
0.36 
 
0.30 
 
0.27 
 
0.26 
 
0.22 
 
0.19 
 
0.20 
 
0.25 
 
0.25 
GM_TURNOVER 0.50 0.46 0.39 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.45 0.38 
PRIVATE 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.34 0.21 
MAJOR  0.42 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.28 0.37 
DIRECTOR 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.74 0.84 0.88 0.87 0.49 
SHR 0.20 0.62 -0.22 -0.20 -0.12 -0.16 -0.12 0.89 0.11 
ROA  0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 
LSALES  19.82 19.94 20.03 20.14 20.29 20.47 20.54 20.67 20.27 
VOL  0.48 0.38 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.37 0.41 0.47 0.38 
FIRM_AGE 4.06 4.54 5.22 5.89 6.57 7.07 7.96 8.60 6.43 
 
Notes: Table contains means of the variables used in the regressions by year. Key to variables: 
CH_TURNOVER = 1 if there is a change in the Chairman in the fiscal year, zero otherwise. 
GM_TURNOVER=1 if there is a change in the General Manager in the fiscal year, zero 
otherwise. PRIVATE=1 if the firm is privately controlled, zero otherwise. MAJOR=1 if the 
largest controlling shareholder has a share-stake greater than 50%, zero otherwise. DIRECTOR=1 
if the fraction of independent directors on the board is greater than 33%, zero otherwise. 
SHR=annualized shareholder returns. ROA=return on assets. LSALES = log firm sales. VOL = 
standard deviation of stock returns over the year. FIRM_AGE = the number of years the firm has 
been publicly quoted. Data source for corporate governance and financial variables: Sinofin and 
CSMAR. 
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Table 2 
 
CEO turnover (Chairman) and firm performance in China’s listed firms 
 
Logit estimation for the period 2002-2006. The dependent variable is CEO turnover: CH_TURNOVER = 1 
if there is a change in the Chairman in the fiscal year, zero otherwise. PRIVATE=1 if the firm is privately 
controlled, zero otherwise. MAJOR=1 if the largest controlling shareholder has a share-stake greater than 
50%, zero otherwise. DIRECTOR=1 if the fraction of independent directors on the board is greater than 
33%, zero otherwise. SHR=annualized shareholder returns. ROA=return on assets. LSALES = log firm 
sales. VOL = standard deviation of stock returns over the year. FIRM_AGE = the number of years the firm 
has been publicly quoted. Regressions contain industry and time dummies. Data source for corporate 
governance and financial variables: Sinofin and CSMAR. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Marginal effects reported. 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pred. Performance variable is:  
  sign SHR SHR ROA ROA 
Economic variables       
PERFORMANCE  − -0.12*** -0.07 -0.10** -0.20*** 
   (-4.84) (-1.41) (-2.35) (-2.65) 
PRIVATE  ? 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
   (0.67) (-0.36) (0.51) (0.69) 
MAJOR  ? 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
   (0.21) (0.89) (-0.03) (0.04) 
DIRECTOR  ? 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
   (0.32) (-0.46) (0.24) (0.28) 
PERFORMANCE x PRIVATE  −  -0.10**  0.14* 
    (-2.49)  (1.91) 
PERFORMANCE x MAJOR  −  0.08**  0.06 
    (2.19)  (0.84) 
PERFORMANCE x DIRECTOR  −  -0.07*  -0.03 
    (-1.74)  (-0.47) 
Control variables       
LSALES  ? -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
   (-4.29) (-4.31) (-4.60) (-4.42) 
VOL  ? 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
   (5.14) (5.00) (4.42) (4.21) 
FIRM_AGE  ? 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
   (5.51) (5.21) (5.33) (5.29) 
Industry & time dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   6142 6142 6142 6142 
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Table 3 
 
CEO turnover (General Manager) and firm performance in China’s listed firms 
 
Logit estimation for the period 2002-2006. The dependent variable is CEO turnover: GM_TURNOVER=1 
if there is a change in the General Manager in the fiscal year, zero otherwise. PRIVATE=1 if the firm is 
privately controlled, zero otherwise. MAJOR=1 if the largest controlling shareholder has a share-stake 
greater than 50%, zero otherwise. DIRECTOR=1 if the fraction of independent directors on the board is 
greater than 33%, zero otherwise. SHR=annualized shareholder returns. ROA=return on assets. LSALES = 
log firm sales. VOL = standard deviation of stock returns over the year. FIRM_AGE = the number of years 
the firm has been publicly quoted. Regressions contain industry and time dummies. Data source for 
corporate governance and financial variables: Sinofin and CSMAR. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. Marginal effects reported. 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pred. Performance variable is:  
  sign SHR SHR ROA ROA 
Economic variables       
PERFORMANCE  − -0.09*** 0.06 -0.17*** -0.20 
   (-3.09) (1.18) (-2.75) (-1.64) 
PRIVATE  ? 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
   (4.90) (4.24) (4.71) (4.81) 
MAJOR  ? -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   (-0.58) (-0.38) (-0.75) (-0.58) 
DIRECTOR  ? -0.03* -0.05*** -0.03* -0.03* 
   (-1.94) (-3.12) (-1.90) (-1.87) 
PERFORMANCE x PRIVATE  −  -0.07*  0.12 
    (-1.68)  (1.03) 
PERFORMANCE x MAJOR  −  0.02  -0.12 
    (0.48)  (-1.02) 
PERFORMANCE x DIRECTOR −  -0.18***  -0.03 
    (-3.55)  (-0.32) 
Control variables       
LSALES  ? -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
   (-1.85) (-1.93) (-1.52) (-1.33) 
VOL  ? 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
   (4.36) (4.51) (3.54) (3.45) 
FIRM_AGE  ? 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
   (3.11) (2.95) (2.83) (2.82) 
Industry & time dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   6142 6142 6142 6142 
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Table 4 
 
CEO turnover (Chairman) and firm performance in China’s listed firms: 1999-2001 
 
Logit estimation for the period 1999-2001. The dependent variable is CEO turnover: CH_TURNOVER = 1 
if there is a change in the Chairman in the fiscal year, zero otherwise. PRIVATE=1 if the firm is privately 
controlled, zero otherwise. MAJOR=1 if the largest controlling shareholder has a share-stake greater than 
50%, zero otherwise. DIRECTOR=1 if the fraction of independent directors on the board is greater than 
33%, zero otherwise. SHR=annualized shareholder returns. ROA=return on assets. LSALES = log firm 
sales. VOL = standard deviation of stock returns over the year. FIRM_AGE = the number of years the firm 
has been publicly quoted. Regressions contain industry and time dummies. Data source for corporate 
governance and financial variables: Sinofin and CSMAR. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Marginal effects reported. 
 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pred. Performance variable is:  
  sign SHR SHR ROA ROA 
Economic variables       
PERFORMANCE  − -0.04 -0.04 -0.60*** -0.62*** 
   (-0.94) (-0.70) (-3.80) (-3.29) 
PRIVATE  ? 0.09*** 0.10** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
   (2.88) (2.19) (3.09) (2.73) 
MAJOR  ? -0.05** -0.04* -0.05** -0.05** 
   (-2.31) (-1.80) (-2.39) (-2.13) 
DIRECTOR  ? 0.18*** 0.15* 0.18*** 0.17*** 
   (2.89) (1.83) (2.81) (2.59) 
PERFORMANCE x PRIVATE  −  -0.02  -0.08 
    (-0.15)  (-0.18) 
PERFORMANCE x MAJOR  −  -0.00  0.08 
    (-0.03)  (0.24) 
PERFORMANCE x DIRECTOR  −  0.16  0.25 
    (0.72)  (0.68) 
Control variables       
LSALES  ? -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
   (-4.58) (-4.55) (-2.79) (-2.78) 
VOL  ? 0.06** 0.06** 0.05* 0.05* 
   (2.47) (2.49) (1.94) (1.95) 
FIRM_AGE  ? 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.00 
   (2.44) (2.42) (1.05) (1.06) 
Industry & time dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   2727 2727 2727 2727 
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Table 5 
CEO turnover (Chairman) and firm performance in China’s listed firms: 1999-2006 
 
Logit estimation for the period 1999-2006. The dependent variable is CEO turnover: CH_TURNOVER = 1 
if there is a change in the Chairman in the fiscal year, zero otherwise. PRIVATE=1 if the firm is privately 
controlled, zero otherwise. MAJOR=1 if the largest controlling shareholder has a share-stake greater than 
50%, zero otherwise. DIRECTOR=1 if the fraction of independent directors on the board is greater than 
33%, zero otherwise. SHR=annualized shareholder returns. ROA=return on assets. LSALES = log firm 
sales. VOL = standard deviation of stock returns over the year. FIRM_AGE = the number of years the firm 
has been publicly quoted. GOV_CODE =1 if year is 2002 or later; zero otherwise. Regressions contain 
industry and time dummies. Data source for corporate governance and financial variables: Sinofin and 
CSMAR. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Marginal effects reported. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pred. Performance variable is:  
 sign SHR SHR ROA ROA 
Economic variables      
PERFORMANCE − -0.05*** -0.00 -0.15*** -0.58*** 
  (-3.11) (-0.06) (-2.83) (-4.48) 
PRIVATE ? 0.02* 0.02 0.02 0.02* 
  (1.66) (1.52) (1.52) (1.79) 
MAJOR ? -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  (-1.49) (-1.51) (-1.63) (-1.54) 
DIRECTOR ? 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
  (0.98) (0.76) (1.03) (1.00) 
PERFORMANCE x PRIVATE −  -0.04  0.15** 
   (-1.48)  (2.01) 
PERFORMANCE x MAJOR −  0.02  0.06 
   (1.02)  (0.77) 
PERFORMANCE x DIRECTOR −  -0.03  -0.02 
   (-0.93)  (-0.28) 
GOV_CODE ?  -0.08***  -0.11*** 
   (-3.59)  (-4.59) 
PERFORMANCE x GOV_CODE −  -0.04  0.36*** 
   (-0.83)  (2.62) 
Control variables      
LSALES ? -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  (-7.07) (-6.87) (-5.63) (-5.34) 
VOL ? 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
  (5.23) (4.94) (4.21) (4.00) 
FIRM_AGE ? 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
  (6.25) (6.09) (5.75) (5.50) 
Industry & time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  8869 8869 8869 8869 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 The number of firms listed on the two major exchanges of China‟s Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges has increased from 57 in 1992 to 1434 in December 2006 with 
a total market capitalization of 89,403 billion RMB (or US$11,462 billion). The stock 
market booming in August, 2007 even pushed the total market capitalization to 245,300 
billion RMB, surpassing the size of Japanese stock markets. Both stock exchanges issue 
two types of shares, share type „A‟ to domestic investors and share type „B‟ to foreign 
investors. Recent “share structure” reform, which consolidates the dual non-tradable and 
tradable shares. The government and the regulatory authorities have long found the 
problems brought by a predominance of non-tradable shares (legal person shares and 
state shares). For example, holders of tradable shares were typically minority 
shareholders with limited power to affect corporate decisions. In addition, the limited free 
float available made the domestic market extremely volatile and prone to insider trading. 
In 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission launched a structural reform 
program aiming at eliminating non-tradable shares. The reform required listed companies 
to transfer non-tradable shares to tradable shares by compensating existing shareholders 
through various ways like bonus shares, cash and stock options. The end of 2006 is set as 
the deadline for such reform process. This paper is using the pre-reform sample. 
 
 
ii
 For example, Guangxia Industry Co. Ltd. based in Yinchuan, a listed pharmaceutical 
company, was found to fabricate sales contracts and export amounts and exaggerate its 
financial statements, reportedly inflating net profits by $90 million. Another example is 
Zhengzhou Baiwen Co. Ltd., a state-owned retail company was later found to have 
inflated its profits by $2.3 million before its listing and by $17.4 million in the three years 
that it was listed. These companies were also found guilty of heavy insider trading. The 
scandals led to widespread investor dissent and criticism.  
 
iii
 There is a large literature on CEO turnover using data from Western economies 
focusing on the determinants and consequences of executive replacement (Core, Guay, 
and Larcker 2008; Faleye 2007; Chidambaran, and Prabhala 2003; Volpin 2002; Mian 
2001; Denis, and Kruse 2000; Denis, and Sarin 1999; Parrino 1997; Denis, Denis, and 
Sarin 1997b; Franks, and Mayer 1996; Kang, and Shivdasani 1995; Kaplan, and Minton 
1994; Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino 2004). Typically, these studies find a negative 
association between CEO turnover and measures of firm performance. 
 
iv
 These refer to current working papers rather than previously published research. 
 
v
 External monitoring mechanisms include a) the managerial labor market (Fama, and 
Jensen 1983; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999); b) product market 
competition ; c) capital market competition and; d) the market for corporate control . 
 
vi
 Removing a poorly performing manager in companies which do not face immediate 
external threats (e.g. bankruptcy, take-over) is one of the most observable signals of the 
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internal monitors' effectiveness. Yet, managerial dismissal can still be partly influenced 
by external factors (e.g. capital market competition). 
 
vii
 A full treatment of ownership issues in China is beyond the scope of this paper which 
is primarily concerned with the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance.  
However, it is worth stressing that there is a significant literature evaluating the 
mechanisms and consequences of separating voting rights from cash flow rights in 
organizations (e.g., Xu et al., 2005). 
 
viii
 The data supplied by CCER Sinofin has been used in prior research, but for earlier 
time periods. See for example Kato and Long (2006a). 
 
ix
 Specifically, if the same person serves as Chairman and General Manager, he or she is 
classified as the CEO. If two separate individuals hold the positions of Chairman and 
General Manager the Chairman is considered to be the CEO so long as he or she is paid 
by the listed firm. Otherwise, the General Manager is considered as the CEO. 
 
x
 It is worth noting that the SinoFin database does not contain the actual name of the 
individual but records only whether there was a change in the name of the person holding 
the most post of “General Manager” or “Chairman”. Also, if there was more than one 
change within the year the information we have available is still the 0-1 indicator variable 
of a change in the CEO. This is consistent with the previous literature. Finally, we should 
also note that unfortunately we do not have available other demographic information of 
the General Manager or Chairman, including age and their tenure. 
xi
 CSRC classifies industries to 13 categories: A: Agriculture and fishery, B: Mining, C: 
Manufacturing; D: Electricity, water and other energy manufacturing and supply; E: 
Construction; F: Transportation and logistics; G: Information technology; H: Wholesales 
and retails; I: Finance and insurance; J: Real estate; K: Service; L: Communication; M: 
Others. Chinese listed firms sometimes report different industry classification in different 
years. When this occurs, the most recent year industry code is applied. 
 
xii
 The interaction effect is calculated using Stata version 10. We note that the magnitude 
of the interaction effect in nonlinear models may not be the same as the marginal effect of 
the interaction term (Ai, and Norton 2003). 
 
xiii
 The significant increase of independent directors on the board is due to the regulation 
“Guidelines for Establishing an Independent Director System in Listed Firms” passed in 
2001, which  stipulate that the board of directors should include at least independent 
directors by June 30, 2002, and at least 1/3 of the directors should be independent 
directors by June 30, 2003. We are grateful to Cheryl Long for discussion on this and 
related points. 
 
xiv
 Below, for completeness, we also investigate the relation between CEO turnover and 
performance over the period 1999 to 2006.  
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xv
 We thank a referee for making this point to us and to Cheryl Long who helped clarify 
some of these issues for us. 
 
xvi
 These include: the “Guidelines for Establishing an Independent Director System in 
Listed Firms” (2001), the “Corporate Governance Code” (2002), the “Announcements on 
regulating related party transactions and debt guarantee in listed firms” (2003), the 
“Rules Governing the Regular Rotation of CPAs in the Auditing of Securities and 
Options Transactions” (2003), the “Rules for Public Listing on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange” (2004), and the “Opinions on How to Improve the Quality of Listed Firms” 
(2005). 
 
